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FAMILY SUPPORT FROM FUGITIVE
FATHERS: A PROPOSED AMENDMENT
TO MICHIGAN'S LONG ARM STATUTE
Robert L. Nelson*
I. Introduction
During the fiscal year ending June 1969, $10.3 million was
spent on aid to 54,000 Michigan families with dependent chil-
dren.1 This represents an increase of ten percent in the number of
recipient families in Michigan and an increase in cost of nearly
sixteen percent over the previous fiscal year. 2 The corresponding
national increases over the past year are even greater.3 A sub-
stantial portion of this growing public burden is attributable to
fathers who have deserted their families and are not providing
their support:
In June 1969, 10.2 million persons [in the
United States] received money payments un-
der five public assistance programs - 1.1 mil-
lion more than in June 1968. [Aid to Families
With Dependent Children is one of these pro-
grams.] The year's rise was attributable large-
ly to the increase of 949,000 in the number
receiving aid to families with dependent chil-
dren. For that program, only 5,000 of the
additional recipients were in families aided
because of a parent's unemployment. Most of
the others were in families in which the father
was absent.4
Approximately two-thirds5 of those fathers who are absent and
*Mr. Nelson is a member of the staff of Prospectus.
'U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, PUBLIC ASSISTANCE STATISTICS JUNE
1969, Table No. 7 (National Center for Social Statistics Report A-2, June 1969).21d.
31d. Nationally, the number of recipient families has increased 16.9 percent since June
1968. Since that time, the annual expenditure has increased 22.5 percent.41d. Introductory comments.
5R. MUGGE, Aid to Families with Dependent Children: Initial Findings of the 1961 Report
on the Characteristics of Recipients, 26 Soc. SEC. BULL. No. 3, 3 at 8 (March 1963)
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not supporting their families are married. 6 Of this group, more
than one-half have simply deserted the family, or are separated
without a court decree.7 The balance of the absent fathers are
divorced or legally separated from their families, deceased, in
prison, or absent for other miscellaneous reasons.8
In order to assure economic security for abandoned families
and to reduce the public cost of family support payments, Mich-
igan has created judicial machinery for obtaining financial relief
from husbands who have illegally left their families.9 In assessing
the probability of obtaining payments under the Michigan appa-
ratus, however, it is important to recognize that in many cases the
husband's whereabouts is unknown. 10 This fact is crucial because
a deserted wife is currently barred from using any remedy that
(Hereinafter cited as 1961 Report). While this figure is taken from a 1961 report, it is
believed that nothing has transpired since 1961 to materially change the trend that
this report revealed. In any event, the precise figure today is not crucial to the point
the author wishes to make.6This article is addressed only to the problem of getting payments from fathers who are
married but who are not supporting their wives and/or children. The area of paternity
adjudication and the problems of support arising therein are outside the scope of this
article. In Michigan, a man has an obligation to provide necessary and proper shelter,
food, care, and clothing to his wife and/or minor children under the age of 17. Failure
to do so is a felony punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for not more than
3 years, nor less than I year, or by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than
1 year and not less than 3 months. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.161 (1968)
71961 Report supra note 5, at 8.
8 1d.
9 For a discussion of the various support remedies presently available in Michigan, see text
of Pt. II infra.
W. BROCKELBANK, in the Introduction to his book, INTERSTATE ENFORCEMENT OF
FAMILY SUPPORT (1960) [hereinafter cited as BROCKELBANK], cites the Tenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution as authority for the proposition that
the problem of getting support from absent fathers is the concern of the states and not
the federal government. A cogent reason for the same conclusion is that the history of
Federal family support bills has not been a happy one. Such proposed legislation has
been introduced by numerous congressmen from time to time, but hearings have
never been held, nor has the legislation ever been reported out of the House or
Senate Committees. Four such bills are presently pending in the House of Represen-
tatives, all of which are nearly one year old at this writing, H.R. 750, H.R. 1284,
H.R. 7972, H.R. 9942, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). There are no immediate pros-
pects for action on any of them. If history is any indication, these bills will suffer the
same fate as their predecessors, only to be reintroduced pro forma at the opening of
the 92nd Congress.
0 1n 75 percent of the cases in the United States in which law enforcement officials were
unable to gain support payments from the defendant, the reason was that his where-
abouts was unknown. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH,
EDUCATION AND WELFARE, SUPPORT FROM ABSENT FATHERS OF CHILDREN RE-
CEIVING ADC 14 (Public Assistance Report No. 41, 1961)
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will impose in personam obligations upon her husband unless he
has been personally served with process. This is the rule whether
the husband is in Michigan,11 or is out of this jurisdiction and the
action is brought under the provisions of the Uniform Reciprocal
Enforcement of Support Act (URESA). 12 Because the deserted
wife in many cases does not know where her spouse can be
found, 13 personal service is impossible and therefore she may be
precluded from bringing an action for her support. The impact of
this situation on the public purse is reflected in the increasing
welfare costs that society is forced to assume.
It is the purpose of this article to propose and discuss an
amendment to Michigan's long arm statute' 4 which will allow the
entry of extraterritorial alimony, separate maintenance, or child
support decrees when Michigan is the state of the marital domi-
cil and the defendant-spouse cannot be located for personal
service of process.1 5 A plaintiff employing the proposed provision
"lMIcH. COMP. LAWS §§ 600.701-775 (1968) prescribes the relationships with Michigan
which will provide a basis for personal jurisdiction in this state. The manner of
serving process is left to the determination of the Michigan Supreme Court. Pursuant
to its rule making powers, the court has promulgated MICH. GEN. CT. R. 105.1,
which provides: "Service of process may be made upon an individual by leaving a
summons and a copy of the complaint with the defendant personally." But see ,
MICH. GEN. CT. R. 105.8 allowing the court some discretion in determining the
manner of service that it may deem sufficient to comply with currently required
standards. For the rules governing notice generally, see MICH. GEN. CT. R. 105-106.12MICH. COMP. LAWS § 780.161 (1968). URESA is discussed and explained in the text
accompanying notes 24-34, infra.
13See note 10 supra.
14 MIcH. COMP. LAWS § 600.705 (1968) as set forth in note 15 infra.
'
5The proposed amendment specifically provides for service of process in any manner
authorized by the court in accordance with MICH. GEN. CT. R. 105.8 that is calcu-
lated to give the defendant-spouse actual notice of the proceedings and an opportun-
ity to be heard. This provision will be an alternative to the use of MICH. GEN. CT. R.
105.1, supra note I1, which shall apply in those cases where the residence of the
defendant is known or could be ascertained with reasonable diligence.
Service of process pursuant to MICH. GEN. CT. R. 105 will give rise to personal
jurisdiction over any person having any of the jural connections with Michigan
prescribed inMicH. COMP. LAWS §§ 600.701 and 600.705 (1968), MICH. GEN. CT.
R. 105.9. Section 600.705 provides:
The existence of any of the following relationships
between an individual or his agent and the state shall
constitute a sufficient basis of jurisdiction to enable the
courts of record of this state to exercise limited personal
jurisdiction over such individual and to enable such
courts to render personal judgments against such in-
dividual or his representative arising out of the act or
acts which create any of the following relationships:
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in a divorce action will be able to seek alimony, separate mainte-
nance, or support payments as if the defendant were before the
court, and the court will have the authority to grant her the
necessary relief. If and when the wife later finds her husband, she
will be able to take immediate steps to enforce the order out-
standing without having to employ the judicial system a second
time to consider essentially the same case presented in the origi-
nal divorce action. The need for such a provision becomes evi-
dent upon a brief review of remedies currently available to a wife
deserted by her husband.
II. Remedies Currently Available to the Deserted Wife
A. Michigan Remedies
1. In Personam and In Rem Jurisdiction
Under present Michigan law, a deserted wife is not totally
without recourse in seeking support for herself and her family
when her husband cannot be found for personal service of pro-
1) The transaction of any business within the state.
2) The doing or causing any act to be done, or con-
sequences to occur, in the state resulting in an action
for tort.
3) The ownership, use, or possession of any real or
tangible personal property situated within the state.
4) Contracting to insure any person, property, or risk
located within the state at the time of contracting.
5) Entering into a contract for services to be rendered
or for materials to be furnished in the state by the
defendant.
6) Acting as a director, manager, trustee, or other
officer of any corporation incorporated under the laws
of, or having its principal place of business within, the
state of Michigan.
16At the risk of oversimplification, it may be helpful to think of domicil as that place which
the layman considers to be his "home". Thus, for example, a person may be tempo-
rarily in Ohio for any number of reasons, but nevertheless be domiciled in Michigan
for purposes of service of process. The concept of marital domicil is not clear. See
Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1944). Thirty-three sections of the RE-
STATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) defined domicil, but none of
them expressly define marital domicil. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS, §§ 9-41 (1934). Section 9 states:
... domicil is the place with which a person has a settled
connection for certain legal purposes, either because his
home is there, or. .. because that place is assigned to
him by the law.
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cess. If the husband is temporarily residing outside Michigan, but
is nevertheless domiciled 16 in this State at the time process is
served, he is subject to general personal jurisdiction in Michigan
courts. 17 This provision applies even if the summons is served on
the defendant outside Michigan.18 If the defendant owns property
that is within the State, the circuit courts have the power to attach
that property and thereby obtain jurisdiction, notwithstanding that
the defendant is not himself subject to personal jurisdiction in
Michigan. 19 Attachment is available whether the property is real20
or personal. 21
When the defendant has no property subject to the jurisdiction
of the Michigan courts, and he is not a domiciliary of Michigan or
otherwise subject to general personal jurisdiction here, 22 signifi-
cant difficulties confront the deserted wife when she attempts to
obtain support payments from her wandering spouse. A possible
solution to this unhappy circumstance is for the wife to go to the
state in which her husband can be found for service of process
and begin litigation in that forum. The practicality of this solution,
however, is premised upon two assumptions which are in most
cases unfounded. First, the plaintiff may not know where her
Comment a to § 9 explains that
.. * a person may be a 'resident' or an 'inhabitant' or a
'citizen' of a place without being domiciled therein, al-
though such 'residence', 'inhabitancy' or 'citizenship'
may be significant for some legal purpose.
Section 27 provides that, with some exceptions, a wife has the same domicil as her
husband. It may not be too inaccurate to conclude from these definitions that the
state in which the litigants last lived together as husband and wife is the state of the
marital domicil.
17MiCH. COMP. LAWS § 600.701 (1968). The jurisdiction over individuals authorized by
this provision results in a binding personal judgment, entitled to full faith and credit in
other states, regardless of whether the cause of action arose in Michigan. See Practice
Commentary following MICH. COMp. LAWS § 600.701 (1968).
18Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940); see also McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90
(1917).
19 M1CH. COMp. LAWS § 600.4001 (1968) and Practice Commentary thereafter. For the
procedure to be followed in attachment proceedings, see MICH. GEN. CT. R. 735.
20MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.751 (1968); Stewart v. Eaton, 287 Mich. 466, 283 N.W. 651
(1939).
When it is impossible to get personal jurisdiction over the defendant and jurisdic-
tion is predicated solely on MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 600.751 (1968) or MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 600.755 (1968) governing attachment of personalty) and 600.400 1, the action
is quasi-in-rem and the judgment is enforceable only against the property itself.
2 1MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.755 (1968).
22See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.701 (1968) note 15 supra.
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husband can be located; thus she is barred from attempting reco-
very via this method.2 3 Second, even if the wife does know where
her husband can be found, she usually will not be able to bear the
expense of interstate litigation.2 4 Thus, litigation in the foreign
forum appears to offer no real solution to her problem.
2. URESA
If the deserted wife knows where her husband is, she may be
able to gain some relief from the provisions of the Uniform
Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (URESA).2 5 This legisla-
tion was promulgated in 1950 by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws to help solve the problem
created when a husband abandons his family and flees the state to
escape his duties of support.2 6 URESA provides for reciprocal
enforcement of support orders with any state "in which this or a
substantially similar reciprocal law has been enacted." 27 URESA,
or a law "substantially similar" to it, has been adopted by all fifty
states, the Virgin Islands, and Canada.28
The mechanics of the legislation are not complex. 29 If a resi-
dent wife alleges facts to the circuit court30 which indicate that
her husband owes her a duty of family support,31 and further
23This is often the case. See note 10 supra.
24The 1961 study of the characteristics of recipients of aid to families with dependent
children, a group with an extremely high rate of "suitcase divorces", noted that: "The
mothers receiving aid to dependent children are concentrated heavily in those oc-
cupational groups in which requirements for training and education are at a minimum,
remuneration is low, turnover is high, and there is little economic security." 1961
Report, supra note 5, at 14.
2MICH. ComP. LAWS § 780.151 (1968).26See BROCKELBANK, supra note 9, at 3; See also Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of
Support Act, Commissioner's Prefatory Note to 1950 Act, 9C U.L.A. at 3.27 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 780.153(1)(1968).28The scope of the enforcement arrangement with Canada is limited to reciprocal enforce-
ment of support orders issuing only from Michigan or Ontario courts. BROCKELBANK,
supra note 9, at 81-83.29This article is concerned only with the civil enforcement provisions of the Michigan
version of URESA. The fact that Michigan URESA does not have separate headings
entitled "Civil Enforcement" and "Criminal Enforcement" does not mean that the
legislature intended to provide only for criminal enforcement of support. Op. A-r'v.
GEN. 430(1952-54). The Act, as promulgated by the Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws, was divided into four parts: 1. General Provisions; 11.
Criminal Enforcement; 111. Civil Enforcement; IV. Regulation of Foreign Support
Orders. BROCKELBANK, supra note 9 at 7.
3 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 780.160(1968).
31The duty of support imposed by URESA is contained in MICH. COMp. LAWS §§ 780.155
and 780.158 (1968).
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alleges that the courts of a second named state can obtain person-
al jurisdiction over the defendant,3 2 the petitioning state court
shall forward the petition to the courts of that state in which the
defendant is alleged to reside.33 It is then incumbent upon the
prosecutor in the proper county of the second (responding) state
to represent the interest of the out-of-state plaintiff in the ensuing
action for alimony, separate maintenance, or child support.a
4
Behind this apparent simplicity, however, lie complications that
in many cases substantially reduce the effectiveness of this legis-
lation. The most evident of these problems is that before an
action may be brought under URESA, the wife, in effect, must
know where her husband can be found for personal service.3 5
Even in the unlikely case that the wife .has this knowledge,3 6 her
chances of obtaining a money judgement are not good. A survey
of county prosecutors conducted by the author in the Fall of 1969
revealed that in Michigan in 1968, for example, only about sixty
percent of the URESA cases filed with the county prosecutors'
offices by non-resident plaintiffs were ever pursued.3 7 Of those
cases that were pursued by the county prosecutors, most resulted
in a support order for the out-of-state plaintiff.38 The enforcement
of those orders, however, varied from county to county, ranging
from "[enforced] very poorly, . . ." to "[enforced] in every
case... "39
32 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 780.161 (1968).33MICH. COMP. LAWS § 780.162 (1968).34MICH. COMP. LAWS § 780.160(a) (1968).35 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 780.161 (1968) provides, in part:
The petition shall be verified and shall state the name
and, so far as known to the petitioner, the addresses and
circumstances of the respondent, his dependents for
whom support is sought and all other pertinent in-
formation.
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 780.163(a) (1968) contains the provisions for proceeding with
the petition if the responding state cannot get jurisdiction over the defendant as
alleged in the petition, such as when the defendant is not, in fact, residing in the place
alleged.36See note 10 supra.37Questionnaires were sent to every county prosecutor's office in Michigan, with approxi-
mately /3 of them responding (26/83) [hereinafter cited as Survey]. While the statistical
significance of this survey has not been calculated, this factor is not crucial. The
responses that were received were sufficiently similar to indicate a trend which would
appear to hold true generally for any county over a period of time.
381d. Of the 60% of the cases filed which were pursued, approximately 89% resulted in




Of the URESA cases that were filed in Michigan but not
pursued,40 the reason given in most instances for failure to pursue
the case was that the court did not have jurisdiction over the
defendant as alleged in the petition. This was usually because the
defendant had changed his place of residence between the time
the complaint was filed and service of process was attempted.41
Other reasons given for not pursuing the cases were that the
plaintiff withdrew the petition or refused to further cooperate with
the county prosecutor, and that the prosecutor's case load de-
manded that a low priority be given to URESA cases as opposed
to criminal matters and other county business. 42 These facts point
to a significant problem; URESA will be effective only if there is
a common attitude among the courts and prosecutors with respect
to support orders for non-resident plaintiffs and enforcement of
those orders. 43 The effectiveness of reciprocal laws depends upon
an even-handed enforcement of available remedies by all of the
subscribing states. Michigan county prosecutors will under-
standably lose their enthusiasm for reciprocal legislation if they
learn that other states cannot be relied upon to assist them when
Michigan is the petitioning rather than the responding state. It is
evident that in Michigan, at least, there is a lack of uniformity in
the enforcement of URESA orders. 44 Thus, even if a URESA
case is pursued by the county prosecutor and an order is entered
for the out-of-state wife, it is entirely possible that the decree will
never be enforced. If Michigan is illustrative of the fate of
URESA cases generally, URESA is frequently a waste of the
court's time, attorney's time, and taxpayer's money, because no
benefit accrues to the impoverished wife and family.
Insofar as a uniform attitude toward out-of-state alimony, sepa-
rate maintenance, and support orders is crucial to the effective
operation of URESA, determination by the foreign forum of the
40 1d. Approximately 40%.
411d.
421d.
43Seaman, Making the Reciprocal Support Law Work, 23 OKLA. B. ASS'N. J. 2284 (1952).
44Survey, note 37 supra. Enforcement of URESA support orders in Michigan varied
widely between the extremes cited in the text accompanying note 37 supra. The
extent of enforcement of URESA orders seemed to relate directly to the size of the
county and the resources available to each prosecutor's office, with the smaller




amount of alimony, separate maintenance, or child support that
the defendant must pay might create an additional problem for the
plaintiff. If the defendant is not flourishing financially in his new
environment, the courts of the responding state may be reluctant
to enter an order that would place the defendant on their own
welfare roles when the benefit of those payments will be going to
another state. This possibility may be mitigated by the fact that
the legislation is reciprocal and the role of the states as "petition-
ing" or "responding" is constantly shifting. This fact, however,
may not be a sufficient incentive to some courts. Therefore,
judicial reluctance to enter an adequate order must also be con-
sidered in evaluating present remedies.
Examination of the family support remedies currently available
in Michigan reveals that the use of each alternative presents the
deserted wife with practical difficulties which she may be unable
to surmount. As a result, the wife and children may become
public charges, and the "suitcase divorce" is perpetuated. The
need for an additional remedy that will facilitate the process of
obtaining support payments from fugitive fathers is evident.
B. Remedies A vailable in Other States
To avoid many of the practical problems that accompany the
remedies mentioned above, at least two states, Kansas 45 and
Illinois, 46 have enacted statutes which authorize the entry of
extraterritorial alimony, separate maintenance, and child support
decrees against non-resident defendants. One element common to
both statutes is the requirement of personal service of process on
the defendant before an in personam decree can be entered. 47
Because these statutes both require that the defendant be person-
ally served before any action for family support can be com-
menced, it is difficult to imagine what practical advantages have
been gained over already existing remedies, particularly URESA.
One of the commentators on the Illinois long arm statute asserts
the virtue of this provision to be that it allows the
45KAN. STATS. ANN. § 60-308(b)(6)(1964).
4 61LL. STATS. ANN. Civil Practices Act Chap. 110, § 17(e)(1968).
4 7Personal service on the defendent in the case of family desertion is thought to be
necessary to comply with due process rights of the Fourteenth Amendment as
enunciated by the U.S. Supreme Court. But see discussion in text at pp. 415 ff.
May 19701
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"Plaintiff ... [to] ... remain in the forum and obtain a money
judgment against the wandering spouse who can be located for
personal service of process."'48 This appears mere" to ula:ict
the URESA remedies which were in effect 49 at the time of this
addition to the Illinois long arm statute. 50 One of the primary
purposes of the URESA legislation is to allow the plaintiff to do
precisely that for which the Illinois statute is heralded. 51 If the
statutes in Kansas and Illinois cannot more nearly attain this goal
than URESA, or if they are not a useful supplement to it, they are
a needless addition to the already crowded arena of civil jurisdic-
tion.
The statutes adopted in Kansas and Illinois may have had as
their purpose the retention of authority in the respective forums
to decide the amount of alimony, separate maintenance, or sup-
port for which the non-resident defendant is to be held respon-
sible. This is a salutary goal, but one which may not be easily
attained. Because an alimony decree is not a final order as to
support payments that have not accrued, it is to that extent not
enforceable in a foreign forum under the full faith and credit
clause of the United States Constitution. 52 If the order is to be
at all enforced in the state in which the defendant does reside, it
4 8Friedman, Extension of the Illinois Long Arm Statute: Divorce and Separate Mainte-
nance 16 DEPAUL L. REV. 45, 47 (1966).
49Illinois URESA became effective July 25, 1949 (Smith-Hurd Annotated Statutes Ch. 68,
§ 58-59).50 The Illinois Legislature merely may have intended to express dissatisfaction with the
operation of URESA when it added this provision to ch. 110. It is also possible, that
the legislature intended that 17(e) supplant the URESA legislation rather than simply
be an addition to it.5 1See BROCKELBANK and Commissioner's Prefatory Note, supra note 26.
52
Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the
public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every
other State. And the Congress may by general laws pre-
scribe the Manner which such Acts, Records and Pro-
ceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.
U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1.
The full faith and credit clause will protect alimony payments presently due and
owing and not subject to retroactive modification by the rendering court. Fut!,.e
alimony payments, as well as accrued payments subject to retroactive modification,
need not be accorded full faith and credit. Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U.S. 1 (1910).
Chief Justice White, summarizing the state of the law in Sistare, noted at 16-17,
First, that, generally speaking, where a decree is ren-
dered for alimony and is made payable in future in-
[Vol. 3:2
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will probably be through a comity arrangement which allows the
enforcing state to exercise its discretion in deciding which orders
it will recognize. If the order entered in the wife's forum offends
the "public policy" of the foreign forum, it is likely that the
original decree will be modified by the foreign court to comply
with what it would have ordered had the action been brought
there originally. Thus, while these statutes purport to offer the
advantage that the plaintiffs forum can determine what relief the
plaintiff shall have, it is largely an empty gesture since the foreign
enforcement problems remain undiminished.
There may even be a disadvantage to the plaintiff who chooses
to use the long arm statute rather than URESA. Under the
former, she will have to hire a private attorney, whereas under the
latter the county prosecutor is vested with responsibility for her
case. 53 If a private attorney could accomplish more for the wife
under the Illinois or Kansas long arm statutes than the prosecutor
could accomplish under URESA, the gains might outweigh the
added cost of retaining the attorney. However, those statutes give
the abandoned wife no remedy beyond that provided by URESA.
Therefore, the expense of employing a private attorney is unnec-
essary. Any plaintiff, regardless of her financial condition, can
employ URESA's reciprocal enforcement arrangements, thus
avoiding the substantial cost of private litigation.
The above discussion indicates that while a number of family
support remedies are available today, none of these remedies will
allow a deserted wife to bring an in personam action against her
husband if she does not know where he can be found for service
of process. 54 She may bring an action for her support only after
stallments, the right to such installments becomes abso-
lute and vested upon becoming due, and is therefore
protected by the Full Faith and Credit Clause, provided
no modification of the decree has been made prior to the
maturity of the installments .... Second, that this general
rule, however does not obtain where, by the law of the
state in which a judgment for future alimony is rendered,
the right to demand and receive such future alimony is
discretionary with the court which rendered the decree.
(that is, a non-final order).
See also, Justice Frankfurter concurring in May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953),
and Justice Rutledge concurring in Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610 (1947).
5 3
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 680. 160(a)(1968).
54 The only method of obtaining support available to a wife who cannot give her husband
May 19701
Prospectus
her husband has been located and personally served. Because of
the layman's usual confusion as to how to proceed in a legal
action, combined with the inability of the judicial system to re-
spond quickly in many cases, a husband who does temporarily
return home, thereby exposing himself to in personam jurisdic-
tion, can easily disappear again before any steps might be taken
against him. Therefore, under a statute providing Michigan courts
with the power to enter a binding in personam judgment against
the nomadic husband when he cannot be found for personal
service, the wife will be able to take immediate steps to enforce
the order should the husband subsequently return home or be
found elsewhere.
III. Extending the Long Arm Statute
A. Proposed Amendment to the Michigan Long Arm Statute
If the plaintiff-wife could obtain an order enforceable against
her husband whenever and wherever she may find him, she could
use that order as authority for immediately levying execution
against any assets he might have 55 (for example, the car that he
drove home), or for obtaining a civil arrest,56 or wage assign-
ment.57 Thus it will not be necessary to acquire personal jurisdic-
tion over the defendant and to litigate the issue of support prior to
obtaining financial redress at a moment when time is at a pre-
mium. Even if this limited situation were the only one in which
personal service of process is quasi-in-rem jurisdiction, notes 19, 20, and 21 supra.
(See GEN. CT. R. 105.8, allowing the court to exercise its discretion in deciding what
method of service it will allow when the plaintiff cannot serve the defendent in any
other manner provided for in Rule 105.)
55See MICH. COMp. LAWS §§ 552.27 and 552.302. See also MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 552.152, which provides:
When any such decree or order (relating to alimony or
support) shall stipulate payments to be made to the
court, and any of such payments shall be in default, the
party prejudiced may make a motion before such court
showing by records in the clerk's or friend of the court's
office, or otherwise, that such default has occurred, and
the court may forthwith issue an attachment to arrest the
party in default and bring him immediately before the
court to answer for such neglect.56MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.6075 and Practice Commentary thereafter.
57 MicH. CoMP. LAWS § 600.5301 et seq. See also MICH. CoMp. LAWS § 552.203 for
assignment of wages for child support.
[Vol. 3:2
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the proposed amendment would be useful, a worthwhile end
would be achieved by providing immediate financial relief to an
otherwise impoverished wife, and concommitantly reducing the
public welfare load.
In addition to the preceding, however, the proposed amend-
ment will have the broader effect of at least partially eliminating
the incentive for husbands to abandon their families for the sole
purpose of avoiding their support obligations. The realization that
they will be immediately subject to a court order if their where-
abouts are ever discovered might well significantly reduce the
number of husbands who leave home for this reason. The fact
that the proposed amendment presents no unwieldy adminis-
trative problems, in contrast to URESA actions, also argues
strongly for its adoption. 58 With these considerations in mind, the
author proposes the following amendment to the Michigan long
arm statute:
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.70559
Section 705. The existence of any of the fol-
lowing relationships between an individual or
his agent and the state shall constitute a
sufficient basis of jurisdiction to enable the
courts of record of this state to exercise limit-
ed personal jurisdiction over such individual
and to enable such courts to render personal
judgments against such individual or his rep-
resentative arising out of the act or acts
which create any of the following relation-
ships:
... (7) WITH RESPECT TO ACTIONS
FOR DIVORCE, ALIMONY, SEPA-
RATE MAINTENANCE, OR CHILD
SUPPORT, THE MAINTENANCE IN
5 8 0ne of the common complaints about URESA revealed by the Survey, supra note 37,
was that it required much paperwork to carry out its provisions, often without any
satisfactory results. An action under the proposed long arm amendment would reduce
the _paperwork in one major respect because it would not be a bi-state action.
Enforcement of any order entered under this legislation will concededly involve
additional "paperwork," but such "paperwork" would become necessary only when
the plaintiff was assured of her recovery rather than at the time of the commencement
of the action when payments are only a contingency.5 9The proposed amendment is printed in upper case. The existing grounds of jurisdition
under § 600.705 are listed in note 15 supra.
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THIS STATE OF A MATRIMONIAL
DOMICILE AT THE TIME OF THE
CAUSE OF ACTION AROSE.
WITH RESPECT TO THE METH-
OD OF NOTICE REQUIRED UNDER
THIS PROVISION:
A) IF THE RESIDENCE OF THE
DEFENDANT IS KNOWN AT THE
TIME OF THE COMMENCEMENT
OF THE ACTION, OR CAN BE AS-
CERTAINED WITH REASONABLE
DILIGENCE, SERVICE OF PROCESS
IN ACCORDANCE WITH GENERAL
COURT RULE 105.1 SHALL BE RE-
QUIRED.60
B) IF THE RESIDENCE OF THE
DEFENDANT IS NOT KNOWN AT
THE TIME OF THE COM-
MENCEMENT OF THE ACTION,
AND CANNOT BE DISCOVERED
WITH REASONABLE DILIGENCE,
SERVICE OF PROCESS MAY BE
MADE IN ACCORDANCE WITH
GENERAL COURT RULE 105.861 BY
MAILING A SUMMONS AND A
COPY OF THE COMPLAINT TO THE
RESIDENCE OF THE DEFEND-
ANT'S PARENTS, IF LIVING, AND
BY MAILING A SUMMONS AND A
COPY OF THE COMPLAINT TO THE
RESIDENCE(S) OF THE DEFEND-
ANT'S BROTHER(S) AND SISTER(S),
IF LIVING, AND BY MAILING A
6
°For the text of MIcH. GEN. CT. R. 105.1, see note 11 supra.
"
1MIcH. GEN. CT. R. 105.8:
The court in which an action has been commenced may,
in its discretion, allow service of process to be made in
any other manner which is reasonably calculated to give
him actual notice of the proceedings and an opportunity
to be heard, if an order permitting such service is entered
before service of process is made upon showing to the
court that service cannot reasonably be made in the
manner provided under the other rules.
der the other rules.
See also MicH. GEN. CT. R. 105.9, providing that service of process under MicH.
[Vol. 3:2
Family Support
SUMMONS AND A COPY OF THE
COMPLAINT TO THE DEFEND-
ANT'S LAST PLACE OF EMPLOY-
MENT, WHEN ASCERTAINABLE,
AND BY MAILING A SUMMONS
AND A COPY OF THE COMPLAINT
TO THE RESIDENCE OF ANY
OTHER PERSON AS ORDERED BY
THE COURT. WHEN SERVICE OF
PROCESS BY THE ABOVE METH-
ODS IS NOT POSSIBLE, SERVICE
OF PROCESS MAY BE MADE IN
ANY OTHER MANNER REASON-
ABLY CALCULATED IN THE OPIN-
ION OF THE COURT TO GIVE THE
DEFENDANT ACTUAL NOTICE OF
THE PROCEEDINGS AND AN OP-
PORTUNITY TO BE HEARD.
C) WHEN PROCESS IS SERVED IN
ACCORDANCE WITH SUBPARA-
GRAPH (A), THE DEFENDANT
SHALL BE LIABLE FOR ALL PAY-
MENTS DUE UNDER THE ORDER
FROM THE DATE OF ENTRY, IN-
CLUDING ARREARAGES. WHEN
PROCESS IS SERVED IN ACCOR-
DANCE WITH SUBPARAGRAPH (B),
THE DEFENDANT SHALL BE
LIABLE ONLY FOR PAYMENTS AC-
CRUING UNDER THE ORDER AF-
TER HE HAS RECEIVED ACTUAL
NOTICE OF THE ORDER OUT-
STANDING. LUMP SUM ALIMONY,
SEPARATE MAINTENANCE, OR
CHILD SUPPORT ORDERS SHALL
NOT BE ENTERED BY THE COURT
IF NOTICE IS GIVEN SOLELY UN-
DER THE PROVISIONS OF SUB-
PARAGRAPH (B).
GEN. CT. R. 105.8 shall confer personal jurisdiction over any defendant having any
of the contacts with the State prescribed in MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.705. For text
of § 600.705 see note 15 supra.
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Adoption of this provision would confer on Michigan courts
the power to enter a binding in personam decree against a
non-domiciliary of Michigan who cannot be found for personal
service of process and who has no property in the State upon
which quasi-in-rem jurisdiction could be predicated. 62 This would
be a significant addition to present Michigan family support re-
medies since the abandoned wife is today most often prevented
from bringing an action for support because she does not know
where her husband can be found for personal service. 63 Further,
since desertion is the "poor man's" divorce, the value of defend-
ant's property subject to attachment in a support proceeding is
often insignificant; thus a quasi-in-rem action is usually unsatis-
factory. In addition to the advantage that the proposed amend-
ment offers over URESA by not requiring personal service of
process before a binding personal decree against defendant can be
entered, it will also allow Michigan courts to determine the
amount of payments for which the defendant shall be liable. This
latter feature will protect the spouse from prejudicial treatment by
the courts of another state. 64 Moreover, since enforcement of the
orders entered under the amended long arm statute will generally
occur when the defendant returns to his home,6 5 full faith and
credit problems 66 concerning the enforcement of non-final orders
will, in most cases, be avoided.
Even if the defendant is found in another state, the Michigan
order may nonetheless be enforced in that state under the full
faith and credit clause as to payments already accrued, and in
equity, under a comity arrangement, as to future payments. If the
Michigan court has entered a lump sum alimony award, the entire
amount will be enforceable under the full faith and credit clause.6 7
52 Even though this provision is an amendment to the Michigan long arm statute, which
establishes jurisdiction over non-resident defendants, the efficacy of the order will not
be impaired by the fact that the defendant never in fact left Michigan, but simply
managed to avoid service of process.
6See note 10 supra.64For a discussion of possible prejudicial treatment, see discussion in text supra at
406-407.
6Although the author can offer no authority for the proposition that husbands return to the
families which they abandoned, the author's conversations with attorneys and county
officials concerned with the problem of family support showed a unanimity of opinion
that this statement is valid.66See text accompanying note 52 supra.
r
7Subparagraph (C) of the proposed amendment, supra, expressly provides that no lump
sum awards shall be made if the defendent was given notice of the action solely under
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The authority of a court to enter a binding judgment against a
defendant not personally served with process raises significant
jurisdictional questions. Whether a court within the state has such
power depends upon whether the defendant has had certain mini-
mum contacts 68 with the forum state, and has been extended
such notice 69 of the action as is reasonably calculated to give him
a chance to appear and defend. 70 It is submitted that the proposed
amendment to the Michigan long arm statute does clearly comply
with these jurisdictional requirements as they have been ex-
plicated by the Supreme Court of the United States.
B. Power to Hear the Case-Minimum Contacts71
The permissible scope of state extraterritorial jurisdiction has
greatly expanded since the Supreme Court decided Pennoyer v.
Neff in 1877.72 Continued adherence to the Pennoyer rule that
the authority of a court is limited to the geographical boundaries
of the state in which it is situated became unrealistic as the
American economy assumed an increasingly interstate posture. 73
the substituted service provisions of subparagraph (B). Therefore, a lump sum award
will be permitted only in those cases in which the defendant was personally served
with process as provided under subparagraph (A). The limitation in subparagraph (C)
is designed to obviate any questions as to the enforceability of a lump sum award
when service of process is made in accordance with subparagraph (B) and the
defendant does not receive actual notice of the order until after its entry.6 8 lnternational Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
69Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank and Trust, 339 U.S. 306 (1950); Milliken v. Meyer 311
U.S. 457 (1940).
70
Under modern doctrine, the power of a state court to
enter a binding judgment against one not served with
process within the state depends upon two questions:
first, whether he had had certain minimum contacts with
the State [cites omitted], and second, whether there has
been a reasonable method of notification [cites omitted].
Gray v. Am. Standard Radiator and Standard Sanitary
Corp., 22 II1. 2d 432, 437; 176 N.E. 2d 761, 763 (1961).7 1For a general discussion of this problem see Comment, Extending "Minimum Contacts"
to Alimony: Mizner v. Mizner, 20 HASTING L.J. 361 (1968).
7295 U.S. 714 (1877).
73
As technological progress has increased the flow of com-
merce between the states, the need for jurisdiction over
non-residents has undergone a similar increase. At the
same time, progress in communication and transportation
has made the defense of a suit in a foreign tribunal less
burdensome. In response to these changes, the require-
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When the Court handed down its decision in International
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 74 it introduced needed flexibility into
the existing jurisdictional standard. The test established by the
court is whether the contacts that the non-resident, non-
domiciliary defendant has had with the forum are sufficient to
subject the defendant to an action in personam in that forum. 75
The contacts which the absent husband has had with the state of
marital domicil clearly meet the minimum contacts requirements
set down by the Court in International Shoe and subsequent
cases. Some of the factors which the courts consider in determin-
ing if "minimum contacts" exist in a given situation include
whether the contacts that the defendant has established with the
forum are "systematic and continuous" and gave rise to the cause
of action, whether the state has a legitimate interest in the pro-
ceeding, and whether the defendant will be unnecessarily in-
convenienced by having to defend in the forum.
The contacts that the defendant spouse would normally devel-
op while living in a state with his wife and family are "continuous
and systematic". This factor is of pivotal importance in determin-
ing the sufficiency of the contacts in most cases. 76 Such contacts
may include employment in the forum state, payment of taxes,
ments for personal jurisdiction over non-residents have
evolved from the rigid rule of Pennoyer v. Neff to a
flexible standard of International Shoe Company v. State
of Washington. Dhief Justice Warren, for the majority, in
Hanson.v. Denckla. 357 U.S. 235 at 250-51 (1958).
74326 U.S. 310 (1945).
75The Court stated that:
... now that the capias ad respondum has given way to
personal service of process or other form of notice, due
process requires only that in order to subject a defendant
to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within
the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum
contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit
does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and sub-
stantial justice." 326 U.S. at 316.76
"Presence in the state has never been doubted when the activities of the corporation
there have not only been continuous and systematic but also give rise to the liabilities
sued on ... " 326 U.S. at 317. See also Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (195w),
Perkins v. Benguet Coal Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
Not withstanding that the "minimum contacts" cases decided by the U.S. Supreme
Court have involved judgments against corporations, and not personal judgments for
alimony, the Nevada Supreme Court assumed that there is nothing inherent in the
"minimum contacts" concept the limits its application to corporations. Mitzner v.
Mizner 84 Nev. 268, 439 P. 2d 679 (1968).
In Mizner, the court, by a 3-2 vote, refused to set aside a partial summary
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and utilization of the state's public facilities. Furthermore, an
action for support grows directly out of the contacts which the
defendant has established in the forum.
It seems undeniable that the state of the matrimonial domicil
has a legitimate interest in taking reasonable steps to assure that
its citizens will not be rendered poverty stricken by the acts of the
defendant-spouse in leaving the state. One measure of this in-
terest is the amount of money spent each year for the support of
those families abandoned by the father. 77
The fact that the plaintiff's other remedies may well provide no
satisfaction also argues for adoption of this remedy, certainly
from a practical point of view.78 The only consideration that
militates against this provision is the possible inconvenience
caused the defendant by making him defend an action in the state
of the marital domicil which is, for him, a foreign forum. 79
It would seem therefore that a defendant who has lived in a
state with his wife and family has surely established sufficient
contact with that state such that its courts can assume personal
jurisdiction over him in a manner consistent with the Fourteenth
Amendment.
C. The Requirement of Reasonable Notice
1. Mullane
In addition to the requirement that a non-resident defendant
judgment granted in a lower Nevada court which accorded full faith and credit to an
alimony award contained in a California interlocutory divorce decree entered upon
extraterritorial service of process.
Mr. and Mrs. Mizner lived in California as husband and wife for 18 years, after
which they separated. Mr. Mizner subsequently moved to Nevada. Fifteen months
after he had left the State, Mrs. Mizner filed suit for divorce in California. Pursuant to
CALIF. CODE OF CIv. PRO. §§ 412, 413, and 417, she was awarded an interlocutory
decree of divorce and $300 monthly alimony. The Nevada court accorded full faith
and credit to this alimony order. It was of the opinion that the activities necessary to
the maintenance of a marital domicil were sufficient to satisfy the minimum contacts
test and held that California did not violate the substantive due process requirements
of the Fourteenth Amendment by ordering Mr. Mizner to pay alimony to his wife.
See notes 1, 2, 3 supra, and section I of text.
-7See text accompanying notes 1, 2, 3 supra.
7 8See generally sections I and 11 of text supra, as to the practical problems which
accompany alternative remedies. This factor has been deemed important in determin-
ing whether the defendant has established minimum contacts with the state. See
McGee v. Int.'i Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); Travelers Health Ass'n v.
Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950); and see note 73 supra.
rrthe interests of both litigants should be balanced in this decision.
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have certain minimum contacts with the forum state, due process
also requires that the defendant be notified of the proceedings in a
manner reasonably calculated under all the circumstances to give
him a chance to appear and defend.80 If the defendant is not
personally served, the least the plaintiff is required to do is to use
that method of service most likely to apprise him of the pendency
of the action. 81
In 1950, the US. Supreme Court decided Mullane v. Central
Hanover and Trust Co., 82 in which the above-stated due process
notice rule was applied. In discussing the constitutionality of
published notice, the Court suggested a flexible test aimed at
balancing the individual interests which the Fourteenth Amend-
80
"An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is
to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated under all of the circumstances
to apprise the parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to
present their objections." Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank and Trust Co., 339 U.S.
306, 314 (1950); See also Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940) in which the rule
was formulated; International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
81Schroeder v. City of N.Y., 371 U.S. 208 (1962). Schroeder involved the attempted
acquisition by the City of New York of the right to divert water from a stream that
flowed through Mrs. Schroeder's land. The City had not attempted personal service
upon Mrs. Schroeder in the original action in spite of the fact that her name and
address were readily available in the public records. The Supreme Court held that
substituted service in those circumstances was unconstitutional. The Court stated
that:
The general rule that emerges from these cases is that
notice by publication is not enough with respect to a
person whose name and address are known or easily
ascertainable and whose legally protected interests are
directly affected by the measures in question.
See also, Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112 (1956). This case concerned
the condemnation of Walker's land by the City of Hutchinson while Walker was out
of the state. Notice of the condemnation proceeding was given by publication in the
official city paper of Hutchinson. The Court held that the method of service autho-
rized by the statute was not sufficient to satisfy the Fourteenth Amendment.
... In Mullane we pointed out many of the infirmities of
[notice by publication] and emphasized the advantage of
some kind of personal notice to interested parties. In the
present case there seem to be no compelling or even
persuasive reasons why such direct notice cannot be
given. Appellant's name was known to the city and was
on the official records. Even a letter would have apprised
him that his property was about to be taken and that he
must appear if he wanted to be heard as to its value.
82339 U.S. 306 (1950). Mullane involved the final settlement of a common trust fund, the
beneficiaries of which were not all known to the administrators of the trust. The
central issue was whether published notice of the final adjudication of the trust assets
afforded all of the beneficiaries due process as required by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.
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ment seeks to protect with the interest of the state in promoting
the welfare of its own citizens. 83 Applying that test, the Mullane
court decided that personal notice was required as to those
known present beneficiaries with a known place of residence.
Service by publication was deemed sufficient, however, for those
beneficiaries whose addresses were unknown and those whose
interests were merely contingent. 84 The Mullane test allows the
courts to assess all factors involved in each case and to then
determine the reasonableness of the manner of the service of
process.
2. Mullane and the Proposed Amendment
Substituted service such as was allowed in Mullane is pecu-
liarly appropriate in actions for alimony, separate maintenance,
and child support when the husband has illegally left his family
and cannot be located for personal service of process. The use
of a proper form of substituted service in such cases falls within
the scope of the due process notice requirements for a number of
reasons. First, the defendant does not have to rely solely upon
service of process to inform him that an action for alimony or
child support is being brought by his wife. Most people would
presumably acknowledge that a married man has undertaken
some obligation of support for his wife and family. Whether this is
recognized as a legal obligation rather than merely a moral obliga-
tion is immaterial. A husband's recognition of the fact that he has
83The Court has not committed itself to any formula achieving a balance between these
interests in a particular proceeding or determining when constructive notice may be
utilized or what test it must meet. 339 U.S. at 314.
84339 U.S. at 319. Notwithstanding that the Mullane court used broad language to sustain
the constitutionality of published notice on the facts then before it, it should be
pointed out that alimony, separate maintenance, and support cases differ from Mul-
lane in two important respects. First, in Mullane the court was concerned only with
the question of cutting off absentee defendant's potential claims to the common trust
fund, whereas in the alimony context, substituted service will be used in a proceeding
to impose affirmative obligations on the absent defendant. Second, in Mullane the
interests of the parties who were given actual notice of the proceeding were
sufficiently similar to the interests of those persons who were not given actual notice,
so that it was not unreasonable to assume that the interests of all the parties would be
adequately protected. To the extent that these differences between Mullane and the
support cases are troublesome, it can be answered that the wife's need for support,
coupled with the state's interest in facilitating the proceedings, the deserting hus-




wrongfully abandoned that obligation affords him a certain natural
notice of the possibility that some action for support may be
brought against him.85 This presumption of natural notice is rein-
forced by the fact that absconding husbands frequently go to great
lengths to avoid being located by their wives. It would appear that
the fugitive husband is hiding, not because he is unaware of his
familial support obligation, but because he is fully aware of that
obligation and is intentionally avoiding his acknowledged financial
responsibility. This element distinguishes support actions from
those in which defendant is being sued on a contract or tort
claim.86 In the alimony, separate maintenance, and support cases,
notice to the defendant is inherent in his own conduct which alone
results in an actionable claim on behalf of the wife.
Second, the reliability of ex parte8 7 evidence in an action for
alimony, separate maintenance, or child support further dis-
tinguishes such cases from many other legal actions. In order to
be entitled to alimony, a resident wife merely has to allege that
she is married, that her husband has deserted her without good
and sufficient cause, and that he has refused and neglected to
support her. 88 In most cases, substantiation of the necessary
allegations is a matter of public record, such as marriage licenses
and welfare data. In those instances where public records cannot
attest to the validity of the wife's allegations of desertion and
need, those assertions will usually admit of accurate evaluation by
a disinterested observer. The Office of the Friend of the Court
often fills this role and contributes to an objective support order
even when ex parte evidence is all that is available. 89 In many
85For a good discussion of natural notice as it relates to due process with respect to
informal probate proceedings under the Uniform Probate Code, see Manlin and
Martens, "Informal Proceedings Under the Uniform Probate Code: Notice and Due
Process", 3 PROSPECTUS 39, 55-58 (1969).
"The concept of natural notice is inapplicable to many legal actions. For example, in an ex
parte tort or contract action it is impossible for the court to determine at the outset if
the plaintiffs allegations are bona fide. The action may be spurious or well-founded.
The likelihood that the claim is frivolous is substantial enough, however, that the
courts should not presume the defendant has any reason to suspect that an action is
being brought against him. It is obvious that a person cannot have natural notice of a
legal action stemming from actions which he never in fact committed. This is dis-
similar to the desertion case, in which the fact of abandonment is objectively ascertai-
nable, and the husband creates the cause of action by his conduct alone.
87Ex parte evidence is evidence introduced on behalf of one party only in a proceeding in
which the other party does not have an opportunity to present conflicting evidence.
88MICH. COMP. LAWS § 552.30 (1968).
89MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 552.251-253 (1968).
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Michigan counties, the amount of support recommended by the
Friend of the Court is determinative, notwithstanding the pleas
and demands of the husband and wife.90 Thus, even though the
husband will not be present at the support hearing, his interests
ordinarily will be protected to some degree. This feature dis-
tinguishes support proceedings from those actions in which the
evidentiary facts are not objectively ascertainable, and where a
damage figure is not easily determined.
In evaluating the fundamental fairness of the notice provisions
of the proposed amendment, it must be recognized that if only
substituted service of process has been used to notify the absent
husband of the proceeding, the order will not be effective against
him until the date on which he received actual notice of its
entry.91 Thus, arrearages will not accrue during that period in
which the husband had no knowledge of the order outstanding.
Another procedural safeguard afforded the husband served
with substituted service is that he, as a matter of right under
Michigan law, may have the order reopened at any time within
one year of the date of entry of the final order.92 If the one year
limit has expired, the defendant may nevertheless petition the
court to reopen the order for "good cause". 93
Finally, the strong interest 94 that the State has in promoting the
welfare of its residents must be considered and balanced against
the interests of the individual defendant. 95 In the last analysis, the
validity of any form of substituted service is to be judged accord-
ing to whether it is reasonably calculated to give the defendant an
9
oConversation with Washtenaw County Friend of the Court.
9 1See proposed amendment, supra, subparagraph (C). Proving the date on which the
defendant received actual notice of the order outstanding may present a difficulty. Of
course, if the plaintiff discovers the defendant's residence, she may send him a copy
of the order by certified mail. The returned receipt will provide adequate proof of the
date on which the defendant received a copy of the order, and, presumably, actual
notice thereof. If the defendant is given a copy of the order in another state, an
affidavit submitted by the person who delivered the copy should also suffice to
establish the date of actual notice. If the plaintiff cannot prove receipt of actual notice
in either of the above ways, she will have to satisfy her burden of proof at the trial if
the question is ever put in issue by her husband. When the date of actual notice is
established, the careful practitioner should ask the court to recite that date in the
order itself so that no problem concerning the effective date of the order will arise if it
is enforced out of Michigan.
O2GEN. CT. R. 528.2.
93GEN. CT. R. 528.3.94See notes i, 2, 3 supra.
95See text accompanying note 83 supra.
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opportunity to appear and be heard.96 It can hardly be said to
offend traditional notions of justice to subject a husband who has
illegally abandoned his family to an in personam proceeding when
his wife has employed all the avenues left open by her husband to
inform him of the pendency of the action. Those obstacles which
prevent personal service of process stem solely from the illegal
actions of the husband, hence he should be estopped from using a
situation of his own making to invalidate service of process when
his wife has in good faith attempted to give him actual notice of
the suit. Natural notice, combined with substituted service in a
form designed to maximize the possibility that defendant will
receive actual notice, and the other aforementioned procedural
safeguards, insure that the proposed amendment conforms to
Fourteenth Amendment due process requirements.
V. Conclusion
The proposed amendment to the Michigan long arm statute will
help reduce the substantial public cost presently attributable to
support of abandoned families. Its adoption would give Michigan
courts the power to enter a binding decree against a non-
domiciliary who cannot be found for personal service of process.
When the defendant can be located for service, the statute will
offer an alternative to URESA if the plaintiff thinks that URESA
would be less effective. Additionally, the statute will close the
loophole now existing when the defendant is not a domiciliary of
Michigan, has no property in the jurisdiction, and cannot be
located for service under existing Michigan court rules or
URESA. The provision is designed to supplement, not supplant,
existing support remedies.
The amendment gives Michigan courts authority to assume
jurisdiction over the defendant, and provides adequate notice to
him of the impending action. The concept of minimum contacts is
not new, and service of process can be made under generally
accepted court rules with which practicing Michigan attorneys are
thoroughly familiar. This latter feature, as well as the fact that the
statute does not require reliance upon a second state to litigate to




An order entered under the amended long arm statute will be
enforceable whenever the defendant is located. Notwithstanding
that this provision will allow entry of an order against a non-
resident defendant upon some form of substituted service, ade-
quate safeguards exist to afford him the due process notice guar-
anteed by the. Fourteenth Amendment.
This provision will also serve the interests of judicial economy
in two ways. First, the court that heard the original divorce action
will not have to hear the same proofs in a second action for
alimony if the wife acquires personal jurisdiction over the defend-
ant. The court can dispose of both the issues of divorce and
alimony or support in one action. Of course, the court will have to
take subsequent action to enforce the order. Such action will be
necessary, however, only when there are immediate prospects of
obtaining financial relief for the wife and removing her from the
welfare roles. The assurance that the court will have to involve
itself a second time only when some benefit will accrue to the
plaintiff and the state must override the additional judicial energy
expended.
Finally, unlike an action under URESA, only one court will be
involved in the proceeding. Thus, burdensome correspondence
and other administrative paperwork will be avoided.
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